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CHINA'S FIGHT FOR 
NATIONAL LIBERATION 
BY CJ%N LIN 
zt two years now the Chinese people have staunchly F" defended their country against the onslaught of the Jap 
anese invaders. When the Japanese militarists on July 7, 
I 193, p d e d  an "in@da!P' in Liukouchiao, they had pre- 
pared, at one blow, to crush the Chinese Republic and turn 
this great country into its wfony. 
1 ,  What they did not d o n  on was that China would show 
prolonged and determined resistance. The Japanese militar- 
ists assured everybody that the war would end with "light- 
ning speed." By seizing Peiping, Tientsin and a number of 
other important centers in North China, J a p  strove to 
"bring China to its knees," but it did not succeed in this. 
Striving, however, to break the resistance of the Chinese 
people by "a crushing Mow," the Japanese army penetrated 
deep into the Northern Provinces of China and launched 
an offensive on Shanghai. 
T h e  Chinese army is showing ever greater resistance to the 
Japanese army. The military aim which the Japanese set 
themselves--to defeat the Chinese army-did not materialize 
even with the capture of such cities as Shanghai, Nanking, 
* Taiyuan and Tsingtao. This convinced the Japanese plun- 
derm that China had no intention of capitulating but, OII 
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the contrary, was firm in its will to defend its nationsl h d e  
W o w  and Sian. 
il 
pendence and existence. It was then that the Japanese strate- . 
gists adyanced a new phn of offensive, whose objectives are 
For the purpose of carrying out this plan the Japanese 
command has at the pmeat moment concentrated vast n a d ,  
air and land form in the Yangtze River valley in an effort 
to reach Hzlnkow by river from the southeast. The present 
drive is being undertaken because the plan of advance on 
~ a n k o v p  from the north-along the Peiping-Hdw Rail- 
way-has collapsed against the stubborn resistance of the . 
Chinese troops. The Chinese air force, grown strong in the 
M e s  against its adversary, is bombing Japanese war ves- 
sels, wh'ie the Chinese land forces, both regular and irreg- 
ular, are conducting extensive operations on both banks I 
of the river. As a result, the Japanese advance has been de- 
layed since the kghhg of July. 
The ~ a ~ a & s e  plan of advance on Sian (Shensi Provinae) 
has met with no better success. The fierce a t a s  of the 
Chinese troops in the adjoining province of' Shansi has 
hindered the realization of this Japanese plan too. 
Not rely* entirely on military force, Japan is actively 
applying its ti-worn methods of "sekiing China with the 
hands of the Chinese themselves," using meKenary pro- 
Japanese elements among the bureaucracy and leading cir- 
cles of the Chinese army. The Japanese militarists are act- 
ing through the traitors to the Chinese people, using primarily 
the Trotskyite bandits in order to sow &belief among the 
Chinese people in their own forces, fill them with terror of ! 
Japanese imperialism, force Cbina to capitulate and abandon 
armed resistance. 
The Chinese people are only too well aware that the set 
purpose of the Japan- aggression is to conquer the whoIe . 
of China and to transform its 450,00~,ooo population into 
colonial slaves of Japanese imperialism. This confronts the 
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Chinese people with one of two courses : resis-d life, 
or submission-and death. And the Chinese pp le ,  in order 
to preserve its independence and existence as a nation, has 
decided to 6ght against the Japanese aggressors to the bit- 
ter end. 
The intensity of the resistance of the Chinese people is 
getting greater and stronger every day. As a result Japan's 
new plan of offensive is also meeting with ever-growing 
I obstacles. 
The attitude adopted ,by the National government of China 
on the question of armed resistance to the Japanese aggres- 
sors has undergoge considerable changes since the beginning 
: , of the war. Consequently, this perid can raughly be divirlerl 
into three stages. 
THREE STAGES OF ARMED BESISXAMCE TO THE 
JAPANESE ACCRE3SORS 
T HE first stage lasted from the events in Liukouchiao until the beginning of military operations in Shanghai. 
~ h o  characteristic feature of this stage was that the Chinese 
government had not yet adopted a resolute position as re- 
gards d resistance to Japanese aggression. 
The Chinese government still cherished the hope that the 
"confict" could be solved by partial resistance and had no 
firm intention of waging a war of defense an a national 
scale. A number of prominent Chinese politicians were of 
the opinion that at least five years, or under the best of cir- 
cumstances not less than two years, would he required to 
make premtions for a g e n d  resistance on such a scale. 
Although the National governmen* did order its troops to 
North China, General Sung &-yuan attempted simultan- 
eously to conduct peace negotiatims with Japan. Tbe Japa- 
nese aggressors took advantage of these negotiations to bring 
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Timtsin, and launch an oEensive on Shanghai. 
1 
up troops, rnske preparations for w r i n g  Peiping and 
The second stage lasted from the lxghhg of operations 
in Shanghai d l  the fd of Taiyuan and Nanking. In this 
period, the foremost people among the Chinese population, 
pPrrtiwtarly the workers, soldiers and students, took up the 
slogan of the Communist Party of China tbat all classes and 
partiw in the wuntry should cohbtate in this sacred war 
of nationorl liberation. Under pressure of the masses of the 
people and with the Japanese army marching on Shanghai, 
the M a t i d  government of China adopted the policy of 
orgauiting armed resistance on a nationat scale. A confer- 
ence on national defmm was d e d ,  military areas appor- 
*.I 
. tioned, reserves mobilized and aonsiderable n& of 
troops dispatched to the f m t .  This period marks the begin- 
ning of a bitter war of defense on the Shanghai front and 
in North China. 
Finally, the third staep--from the fall of Shanghai and I 
Nanking up to the present time-has been marked by wer- 
growing a c t i v i ~  on the part of Gina's armed forces, of- 
fensive action and initiative cm the part of the Chimesc com- 
mand, the gn>wth of partisan warfare and the extension of 
the hse of the anti-Japanese national united front. 
After the seizure of Nanking, Japan attempted, through 
the medium of the German amhssador to China, to force 
China to eapitdate. The propods of the Japanese aggres- 
aors met with support among certain pro-Japanese dements 
in China, who at tbat time were still holding government 
positions. These pro-Japanese elements who were bent on 
reaching a compromise, in conjunction with the Trotskyite 
bandits, those outright agents of Japanese hpuialism in 
China, tried to induce the government to conclude a sbarne- 
fd m e .  But the government and the commander-in-chief, 
Chirrng Kai-shek, rejected the terms of v e n t  offered 
by Japan. 
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This was a crucial rnoment for Chi .  The Commdst 
Party of China and the foremost and mmt far-* lead- 
ers of the country were the decisive factors in fighting the 
traitors and overcoming the waverings of those who, dis- 
heartened by by losses suffered by the Chinese army and 
by the ~ a ~ &  offensive, were inclined to adopt these shame- 
ful terms of apitulatim. 
At this critical moment, the Communist Party proposed a 
number of definite measures for strengthening the i d i e d  
Chinese army. It proposed that a political department be 
orgadzed attached to the general staff of the Chinese army ; 
it actively helped to introduae universal military b c e  and 
devhped a widesiread anti-Japanese movement mong the 
masses of the peqIe. The Conrmtmist Party proclaimed that 
it was ready to render every help to the governmeat to set up 
a defense industrg in China. 
The example of the heroic struggle of the masses in the 
North and in Central Chiua and the successful operations 
of the Eighth Revolutionary People's Army exerted consid- 
erable influence on the commanders of the principal seetors 
of the fronts, inducing them to display greater dekrmination 
in offering armed resistance to Japan. The Communist 
Party succeeded in rapidly concentrating the former Red 
partisan detachments in the region of the central front and 
forming them into a new my-- the  Fourth Army-which 
was assigned to engage in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's 
rear on the Nankhg-Hangd~m-Shanghai sector. 
The appeal addressed by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party to the Chinese people, d n g  u p  them 
to offer armed resistance in order to achieve a find victory 
over the Japanese aggressors, met with warm support aad 
a ready response araoag the m. 
During this priod Chiang Ksi-shek issued aq appeal to 
the people and the m y  in which the gwerament aad the 
army command proclaimed their readiness to offer mnsis- 
7 
tent armed resistance to the enemy. Quite a number of 
vacillating and irresolute commanders who had surrendered 
a number of towns to the Japanese without showing any re 
sistance were dismissed from the army. The ttaitor Hang 
Fu-chu and a number of others whose treachery had un- 
era1 Chen Qleng was set up at general headquarters. 
doubtedly facilitated the Japanese advance were shot. The 
Chinese people regarded these measures of h e  government 
as an achievement "equivalent to a big victory in the field 
and as a turning point in organizing determined resistance 
to the enemy." The adoption of these measures put an end 
; to the activity of the compromising elements in the gov- 
ernment apparatus. A poiitid departmqt headed by Gen- 
Since the beginning of the war China bas suffered a 
number of serious military reverses. The Japanese have 
seized considerable territory in North and Central Chiria, . 
including a number of large cities-Shanghai, Nanking, Pei- I 
ping, Taiyuan, Tientsin and Wuhu-the population of which I 
has k e n  subjected to a reign of terror. 
H o w m ,  the seizure of Chinese territory has cost the 
Japanese very dear. According to the latest information, 
Japan has already dispatched ~,troo,ooo men to China. The 
losses suflered by the Japanese imperialists during the first 
twelve months of its predatory war in China amount to 
over 350,- soldiers kilIed and wounded, no less than 6m 
military planes and upwards of thirty war vessels. The war 
of depredation in China is costing the Japanese about goo,- 
-,- yen a month. 
In Japan the rise in prices and the repeated h m e  in 
taxes has considerably worsened the aonditions of the work- 
ing masses. During the latter months of the war the t& 
of the unemployed have been swelled by over half a d i m  
people as a result of the dosing down of factories and the 
atastrophk situation in the petty, semi-handicraft indus- 
tries. The peasntry is in particularly d i h l t  straits ; the labor 
- 8 1 
I shortage in the countryside and the rise in prices, especially in the prices of *a1 fertilizers, is briqimg in its wake a reduction in the area sown under rice, resulting in slow starvation. The chauvinistic frenzy of the early days has, in 
the main, s e t  itself. Deep dissatisfaction over the war is 
making itse.1 f felt in the country. Japan's man-pwer is lim- 
ited, while the Mongolians and Manchurians conscripted in 
these subjugated regions only too readily come to realize 
that their place is on the other side of the front-among the 
Chinese people who are fighting for their independence and 
national liberation. 
THE CAUSES OF CBINA'S M ~ I T A R Y  REVERSES DURING 
THE..EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR 
T HE Ioss of a part of its territory can only be considered a temporary reverse for China. It by no means decides 
the issue of the war. The government, the people and dl the 
=ti-Japanese political parties of China soberly estimate the 
temporary reverses at the front and the important successes 
which have already been won in the cause of the war of 
defensq. 
China suffered a number of military defeats during the 
last century-in the opium war of I@, in the war of 1856- 
1857 against England and France, in the war of 1884 against 
France, in the Sino- Japanese war of 1% and in rgor at 
the time of the Boxer Rebellion The f eudd rulers of China 
pursued a policy of capitulation to the conqueror. A general 
fear of Japan grew up in China as a k u l t ,  and this feeling 
undoubtedly did much to iduence the policy adopted by 
the Chinese government during the &st period of the pres- 
ent war of defense. But tbis war of defense against f apsn 
has roused all the people to fight for the integrity and inde- 
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p e n d e n a e o f C h h , ~ a ~ t h e m t i t l b e r e n t f o r m  
of the Chinese people, has Wed the government and the 
army with coum.ge and detamhath, and has burst the 
bubble of "Japmophobia!' 
What is the cause of China's temporaryrary reverses and 
loses in this war? 
Zmperi9list Japan made Ieagthy mans to d t  - 
China, arming itself to the teeth. Cbina, on the other hand, 
was a semidonid comtiy relatidy poorly armed and 
poorly prepared for defense. And in order to offer success- 
ful resishce to the enemy it had to reorganize ia the prm- 
ess of the war. 
A fact ~f major importance h6ng the first s e e  of the 
war wa! that for a long time China lacked internal unity. 
In addition, a number of s t r a w  and political ern>= 
were commi~d.  In tbe *st place, the mnese govemmmt 4 
did not hediately resolve to offer determined armed re- \ 
sistmce, and this enabled its adversary ta m t r a h  it8 I 
fmops on Chinese territory, while China had not yet mom- 
ized dl its armed foxes to resist the enmy. Then + the 
capture of such shtegic poinb as Peiping and Tientsk en- 
&led the Japatlese army to hunch aa p f h s i v e  westwardti 
and southmrds d&g the Tientsin-Fdmw, P4pi.g-Hdow 
aad Peiping-Suiyuan railways. 
&ring the fvst stap of the war the chin- a& mn- 
W itself mostly to methods of WVO deftme htd of I 
resorting to active defense, combining trench warfare with 
that of tactid methods. As long as it m n h d  itself solely 
to trench warfare, the Chinese army, outdasd by the enemy 
in t e c h i d  equipment, was unable to def cat it. 
Another ckumstance of very considerable import was that 
political work was not m u d 4  on a sdlkknt sale among 
the m a w  of the papahtion. At the beg.inniag of the l ~ a r  
of defense the Chinese gov-t did mt display the 
nemmry determination in combating p m  Japanese elements 
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and traitors; nor were the progressive elements of the m u -  
lation d s t e d  in active work to a s&cient degree. In spite 
of tfie insistence of the Communist Party and a number of 
other organizations in Cbina, not df the anti-Japanese grottp 
ings and parties have been enlisted in active work in the 
anti-Japanese mtianaI united fmt .  
In the course of this war of defense, especially after the 
Japanese occupied Nanking, China achieved a number of 
important successes which enabled its army to display more 
initiative and =ti+, organizing successful resistance to 
the Japanese invaders. 
In the first place, the war against Japan gave rise to a 
degree of internal unity ttnpncedenkd in the history of 
China. Ever since the Manchu dynasty was overthrown in 
191 I China has been the scene of constant internal wars 
among the miBtarists, and beginning with IW, when col- 
laboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist 
Party ceased, the scene of a dvil war that lasted ten years. 
A political struggle was also in p r o p s  between the central 
government of China and the local authorities. 
The war of defense against Japan has welded together 
the progressive politid parties of China, established a bet- 
ter understanding between the central government and the 
local authorities, enhanced the prestige and the power of the 
national goverument, and improved relations between the 
government and the people. 
One of the foremost acbiwements of the war of defense 
against J a w  is the radial change in the policy of the 
Chinese govemmt. 
TBE RADICAL CHANGE IH THE POLICY OF THE 
CHTNESF WVERMMENT 
W amms kfore the pres~nt war of defense the Chinese government pursued a policy of compromise and 
capitulation with iegard to the Japanese aggressors, and 
within the country conducted an armed struggle against the I 
Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army, now the pol- 
icy of eapitutation to Japan Iras been replaced by one of re- 
sistance, and the policy of fighting the Chinese Red Army 
and the Communist Party by a policy of collaboration with 
them, a policy of rallying all groups and organizations which 
I 
are devoted to the interests of the national independence of 
China and are striving for the economic and cultural ea- 
hancernent of the entire country. The Chinese government is 
today beeoming a genuine government of national defase. $ 
Dernocmiic measutes are King introduced as far as pos- I 
sible in the interests of strengthening the country's defenses : 
a number of emtrgeney laws have been repealed, certain lib- 
erties have been granted to the mass organizations, mass meet- 
ings are held on questions of national defense. After the 7 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party coneludd an agree- 
ment on the establishment of an anti-Japnese national 
united front, the government released about 30,- political 
prisoners, many of them Communists. 
The stmggIe that bas begun against traitors and saboteurs 
in the g o v m e n t  apparatus is also a big step forward. 
A National PoliticaI Council has been established, the 
first session of which was held July 6-15, 1938. Although 
this council is not yet a fully representative organ of the 
whole of the Chinese people, nevertheless, its very estab- 
lishment, together with the introduction of elementary demo- 
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cratic Iiberties, is a considerable step forward on the road 
to democl.abtioa 
The National Political C o d 1  is composed of represent- 
ativa of all the provinces of China including those which 
have been seized by the Japanese, representatives of all p- 
litical parties and organizations (including seven of tbe 
leading figures of the Communist Party of China : Mao Tse- 
tung, Wang Ming, Tsing Pan-sing, Lin Chu-han, W u  
Yui-chan, Tung Pi-wu and Teng Yinehao), several repre- 
sentatives from the young people's party, the All-Chinese 
Askation of N a t i d  Salvation (a mass anti-Japanese 
orgsnizaticm which arose in rm). the Party .of National 
Socialists, peasant societies, military cides, etc. The task of 
the council is to master. China's most able and leading sons 
to help the government in its guidance of tbe country and 
the war. The representatives of the Communist Party on the 
Co~mciJ stated in their letter that : 
I'. . . the establishment of the National Political Cwn- 
cif during the war of liberation evinces that the plitiml 
life of Chitla is p&g towards democracy and that 
the uuited front of the prties and the people is devel- 
oping still. further. . . . We Communists, having in mind 
the possibility of developing tbe C o d 1  into a genuine 
body of people's representatives, will enthusiastically 
and sincerely participate in its work." * 
A most important result of the anti-Japanese national 
united front has beet, the organization of a single national 
army. Formerly the Chinese army was a weapon in the hands 
of the various militarists for the purpose of carrying on 
. i n b & e  warfare. The local troops were not subordinate 
* ScQ "&chation by Communism, Memhra of the Nationd Polit- 
ical &und of China, p. 6 1. 
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to the wntd mtunand The provincial troopsadid not pos- 
sess properly trained o%cers, their equipment was not uni- 
form, was tlflaqually distributed, and eo m. 
Numerically, tke Chinese army is one of the largest in the 
world. The forces subordinate to the central government in 
1936 included 148 divisions and q8 special brigades of in- 
fantry, f i e  artiilery brigades, 21 artillery regiments, a d  
five engineering regiments. Including its auxiliary forces and 
aviation, the Chhese army i n ~ ~ t e  to the central gov- 
mtment n u m M  r,p,ooo men. The provincial troop 
consisted of about 60 bodies of troops (bripdes and divi- 
sions) rmdxrhg ~ , o a o  men; fmmmIy these units were 
actually not aabordhate to the central command, 
After the war against Japan started, a u n i s e d ~ ~  
m y  waa established for the first time, which has sitace lx- 
come a genuine srmy of national defense The p'ovincial 
troops wtre mobilized for active senice at the front and 
placed under the orders of the catraI command. After Hang 
Fu-chu and a n u m b  of other hitom were shot, relations 
between the local authorities and the ceaw command im- 
proved considerably, and the prestige of the unified high 
command was d a d  
The m y   ha^ become a genuine national army. The de- 
fense of the country-that is what constitutes its i d d ,  its 
task. h e  is the old type of soldier who for the sake of 
higher pay left the service of one militarist to throw in his 
lot with another. The Chinese soldier of today dacIares 
proudly : "I am a soldier of the people." Its discipline, its 
contact with the population, its conrage and devotion to the 
national muse, have won the army great prestige. T'he time 
when the population was terrified at the arrival of army 
uaits in their district is now a thing of the past. Today the 
population gives them a cordial welcome, organizes auxil- 
iary detachments and wages s joint struggle against the ag- 
gressors. These changes in the sentiments of both the people 
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and the men are a major factor in the M e n s ~  d the-corm- 
try and the dedopmcnt of the future detumde Cb*. 
Of prime h p t a n c e  is the ahdomuat of the f m r  
methods of wive defense, traditional for the old Ctrimse 
army, for more active operations. Today the Chinese atmg 
coordinates trench warfare and tactical maneuvering on the 
flanks with the activities of the partisan detdments k the 
rear of the enemy. Thanks to these methods the Chinese 
forces successfully held up for a Iong time the enemy's 
progress on tht Northern and So& sectors of the 
Tienh-Mow railway and won a number of victories near 
Taierbchwang. Inathe pxoviace of S W i  C&iang Kai&ek 
c m h d  he Chinese to remain om the Northern bank 
of the Hwg-ha, and although the Japanese have approadd 
-the river, tkey dare not cross for in their rear are consid- 
erable ,Chinese forms which con8tantly hams them and 
strike blow after blow at tfieir lines of comtnunic~tion. 
And here, in th rear.of the J a w  army, the Chimx 
m e ,  on the h i s  af the collaboration o* the KuominWg 
and the IConumdst Farty, have driven the Japanese frwn 
a vast territory and restored the authority of the Chinese 
. g o v ~ t .  Over forty counties with a population of from 
five to six million people have k united under Chinese 
authority in the bwder regim of Shansi, Hop& and Chahar 
provinces, in the MU of the Japanese. In Apd, rg38, a sec- 
and "htd Hopeh Government" was set up in the center 
of the p v k e -  These g o m e n t s ,  having organized a 
popular army of m,m men, are keeping the Japanese 
nar and lines of commtmi(;~tion under constant threat, and 
are extendig their territory and organizing the population 
for the struggle against the aggressors. 
The Chinese army can also l o r d  a number of achieve- 
ments in improving the t&*cal knowledge of its forces, 
Pditical work which is now being consi~tently conducted in 
the army has served to enhance the pol i t id x m p n  and 
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national self-ccmsciousness of the officers and men.; &mi- I 
pline has k e n  strengthened. The traditions of the provincial 
troops of the militarists are gradually disappearing. 
The Chinese government devotes particular attention to 
supplying the army with u p b d a t e  equipment and estab- 
lishing reserves. It is successfully purchasiing equipmeat 
abroad and at the same t ine  carrying out measures to estab- 
h h  a munitions industry, as well as other industries, in the . 
interior regions of Chink Thanks to the devotion and heroic 
effort of the Chinese workers the government succeeded in 
evacuating a number of important enterprises from districts 
which wwe in danger of being o m p i e d  by the J a p e s ,  and 
subsequently were partly occupied. The b& arsenals in Nan- 
king, Fmhow and other cities were evacuated in p d  time. 
The Chinese army now pomaaes an air force distinguished 
by its exceptional d a k  and initiative; its losses are in- 
variably less than those of the many. The high ideological 
and politicaI qualities of the Chine* air force, its splendid 
technique and daring were demonstrated to the world in the 
flights, unparalleled in the history of China, by Chinese air- 
men over the territory of Formosa and over big cities and 
ports in Japan, when Chinese airphnes sattered IeaAets call- 
ing upon the civil population to resist the war of plunder 
against China, which is spelling ruin to the Japanese people. 
The Chinese government is incrasing and reinfoxing its 
army by forming a number of new divisions and introducing 
universal niiitary service to replace the former system of 
hiring soldiers. The methods of guerilla warfare, repeatedly 
proposed by the Communist Party of China, have been 
adopted an a large scale. Regular army units are mare and 
more being used for this purpose in the enemy's rear; the 
partisan movement is being organized extensively among the 
local populatiwn. The partisan movement is developing not 
only in the zone of operation of the Eighth Army on the 
Northern front but also in Shantung, Kiangsu and Che 
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kiang. The Japanese army L in constant danger of p w t k ~  - 
attacks on ?he citia, d w a y s  and mads it h occupied This 
compefs the Japanese to. maintain large forces in the rear 
for combating the partisan units. Taking into consideration 
the Japsne8~ I& of m e r y e s  for conducting large scale 
operations in the main directicms, this, of course, adds to 
their permanent difficultits. 
THE EIGHTH REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S AILMY AND THE 
SPECIAL flISTRICT OF THE -PUBLIC OF CHINA 
T HE far-famed Eighth Route Army has all along played an enormous part in decting the radical reorganization 
of the Chinese army, in establishing a fishting m y  of the 
Chinese people, welded by its single command and its single 
aim of struggle against the Japanese aggressors. 
This atmy, formed from the rmb of the former Chinese 
Red Army, has behind it ten years of experience in conduct- 
ing a successfid tacticat and pa&an warfare under the 
most difficult conditions, often ending in victory over the 
many times superior enmy pitted against it. The Eighth Route 
Army grew up and was tempered in a constant, arduous and 
heroic struggle with the result that it has accumulated a 
d t h  of b e u c e  in revolutionary warfare. The Eighth 
Route Army bas perfect mahitery of the qdfk mehods of 
conducting an armed struggle againat an enemy superior in 
teehaid eqai*. This is based on the skillful combina- 
tion of trench warfare, tactical maneuvering and guerilla 
warfare, Gaining from the cxpience of the Eighth Army, 
the entire Chinese army is mastering thw methods, as a 
restdt of which the betterquipped, splendidly trained army of 
Japan, which had been m a h g  preparations for war for a 
n& of years, annot achieve the sucess~~ it had ex- 
pected. 
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The Eighth Army began operations against the invaders 
under very dii%eult conditions, Its equipment m oampara- 
t idy  out of date and not uniform; it lacked not only heavy 
artillery, b k s  and aviation but even mountain guns. The 
glorious victories won by the Eighth Army are due largely 
to the politid ~sciousnem, discipline and enthuslam of 
its men, the flexible e c s  and able Idership of b eotn- 
manders, the daring and determination of all its cornhatants. 
In 1937, immediately after the e v e m  in Liukouchiao the 
Eighth Army addressed a request to the C b i  govern- 
ment tbat they be sent out against the Japanese aggresors, 
and w h  a very tense Jtuation arose in North China in 
August, 1937, the Eighth Amy, mdcr Chu Teh, was trans- 
ferred to the Morthcrn p t  of S h s i  province* 
The dispatch of the Eighth Army to the front attracted 
gentral attention axld a r d  eaormoas et l tbrssh among 
the peopfe and the Chinew m, 
From the fist day of hi arrival at the front the Eighth 
Army command toolr the following fundammtal pridples 
as the basis of its qmatims and of politid wurk among the 
masses. 
The first basic principle is that the army must wage war 
on the lines of tactical and p h  action, abandoning the 
trench warfare f rmtal defense tactics exdusivefy applied 
formerly throughout the Chinese army ; it must strike at the 
enemy's t h k  and r a r ;  it must launch a p t k n  war in 
the immediate and distant rear of the emmy; destroy its 
Lines of c o m m ~ t i o n ,  stxikc at tk reinfoicements the en- 
emy dmws up, and c m ~ t e  its own a d m u  with those of 
the other Chinese units. The commaad of the Eigfith Afmy 
~ t W t t O 8 h t h e r e s t o f t h t C h i n e s e ~ t h e m e c t  
strategy and tactics in the war against Japan. 
TIE second principle is incmxd a d *  ia organ- 
izing and atming the local population and mblishiqg rally- 
ing centers of @sari *fare in the eoemy's -. The par- 
@ 
tisan actions of the people must be combined with tlmohic of 
the regular army. The command of the heroic Eigbth Route 
Army, and the Communist Party, which @ed it and 
i m w  it, are proving h actual fact that only by mobihhg 
and orgdnizi the masses, by launching a @m war with 
the active participation of the broad masses the Chinese 
people offer Iastiq resistance and achieve vicbry over the 
J a p e s e  aggressors. The measures taken by the 'Eighth 
Army directed the attention of the government and of the 
other Chinese army units towards organizing the masses of 
the people and developing the partisan movement in all dis- 
tri& in the vicinity of the front. 
The third basic principle is political work within the army, 
close contact with the local population and inmssd d v -  
ity in disintegrating the forces of the enemy. 
Due to the enormous work that is berng done in the Eighth 
Army, the able leadership of Chu Teh, the energy of the 
political department, the commissars and the Conrmrmist 
Party organizat~om, the Eighth Army has succeeded in 
creating a mighty core to serve all the armed forces of 
China. 
The victory which the Eighth Army won at Pinghsinkuan 
(September q-a7,1937) was china's first big victory in the 
war against Japan. The Eighth Army mashed the finest 
Japanese di&ion--the Fifth TXvisi-dy wiping 
out one of 'its brigades. After this successful operation it 
penetrated into the enemy's rear, surrounding its Rsnks and 
cutting off the Japanese communications in the Northern 
part of Shansi province. While other units of the Chinese 
army continued activities on the front, the Eighth Aimy was 
active in the enemy's rear. It captured over a thousand mo- 
tor trucks and destroyed twenty-one airplanes ; together with 
the partisans, the Eighth Army forces struck at the ememy 
reinforcements. As a result, over w,ooo Japrrnese troops 
stationed in the vicinity of Sinkw (north of Taiyuan) were 
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left witbout ammunition, fuel, and food supplies. Their ar- 
tillery and tanks were put out of action. The enemy could 
&ah only very d quantities of food supplies a d  mu& 
tians by air. Thus, during the severe fighting in the vidinity 
of Sinkou, which went on for over twenty days, the Eighth 
Army placed the memy in a very di&utt position. 
The Eighth Army is strong because of its mobility. The 
characteristic fature of most of the commanders is their 
initiative and the fact that they are accustomed to take in& 
pendent action. The Eighth Army can rapidly concentrate its 
1 
forces to carry out some Wg opatim, but it can equally as 
welt break up into small units to a"y on partisan warfare. 
The Eihtb Army oftax s d s  in defeating forces supe- 
rior in nwtlber. It skillfully applieg the method of a sudden 
flank attack on the enemy, as a result of which the enemy's 
losses arc usually -era1 times as great as its own. 
On one occasim when h o  companies of the Eighth Army 
were acting m the rear of an enemy unit of over 3,000 men. 
the enemy d d  not achieve success although in the course 
of a single day it fired over I,W sheUs and suffered at least 
500 casualties. On another -ion a single company of the 
Eighth Army succeeded in defeating a Japanese unit o f  
a h ~ t  600 men without itself suffering any casualties. A bat- 
talion of the Eighth Army d e d  out a night attack on a 
strongly p m k t d  Japanese air field, and after a hand-to- 
hand fight with the guards destroyed twenty-one enemy 
planes. 
I 
The diary of a Japanese'd?icer who was taken prisoner 
by the Eighth Army had the following entry: 'When we 
come u: against the Eighth Army our heads begin to whirl, 
because it always appears suddedy and me a n  never tell 
when it d l  come or go." 
When it finds itsdf at a disadvantage, the Eighth Army 
strives to avoid big losses and effects a swift h t ,  in 
order to d m  on the enemy and deliver hhh a crushing blow. 
The atDars ud rltoria of tbe Eighth A m I j P ~ W  
r a i d  the @ts of the Chinese fqms and f i l ldw'ddil  
the assmalacemof v i c tq .  Tbe tach of tht E3ghth - 
enable the ~ b e r  Chinew units at,  study in p d t e  how ha- 
p-t it is to combine trench warfare with factid m- 
avers and partisan w a h .  The Eighftr Army is e
ling the J a p m  ta abandon the OUtflanIcing. which 
they wtlIy apply against Chinese Wp, since by the Chi- 
nese sudden - atlacks it often wipes out entire enemy 
unlts. The E i t h  Army has cmqebd the Japehie to sat- 
ter thcir f- and withdraw kge units fmaz the froat tO 
guard camnunidom in the rear, 
D d q  the m a t i o n s  in the north of S b s i  province the 
Eighth Army has never for a moment rebed its wmk of 
orgadhg and the masses. I n  consequence of its in- 
tensive politid and edrntional w r k ,  large anti-Japan= 
d u t i e s  of National Salvation, a pasat league, a women's 
league* trade d o n s ,  self-defense &a&ments and other 
mass arpdzations h v e  been established ia the cdurse of 
a d o r t w o .  
The Eigha Route A m y  has assigned a group of ib men, 
Ioag experkncecl in o w  partisan warfare, to work 
among the laad population. These cadres lead the numerous 
partisan detachmats formed in the region of its operati* 
b y t b t ~ u d p o p u h t i o a T h e ~ u n i t s a r e a ~ n o t  
mlywaholdgunsandrifim left behind at- time by the 
Chinese trw, but to a certain dent also with modem 
arms captuPed from the enemy, The partisans are often short 
of arms, of warm clothes, and medial supplies, but in spitz 
of &is the number of these units is m t l y  growing, gain- 
ing in experience and strength, aad profiting by their many 
e n m e  with &e enemy, 
Swne of me m*ts ate @ d p  uniting into hqer fow- 
ticms.Thrrs,in~borderdi~ctsoftbe~,Hophand 
~ ~ , ~ l ~ f ~ ~ ~ f p t m b t m i t s  
r- - 81 
I 1  I . .  
bye been created n & i  from 5 m  to 6,- men each 
A military Hea headquarters has also been set up to provide 
a united command for these peutisan units. This parti- 
area shows how new wits should be formed in the enemy's 
rear, Partisan units often appear around Peiping, they tear 
up the tracks of the Peiphyi-Hankow railway, make surprise 
attacks on the Japanese forces around Tientsin and the 
Tientsin-Pokow railway, aad strike telling W s  on the 
enemy* 
One of the most important results of the &pan struggle 
waged by the Eighth Route Army is that the other armies, 
profiting by its experience, have also begun to develop a 
partisan struggle in the enemy's ma. Numerous courses to 
train leaders of partisan units have been &d in the 
other armies. The Eighth Army often receives requests from 
other armies to supply instructors on fht tactics of partisan 
warfare. Thanks to the Eightb Army the partisan move- 
I 
ment has come to play an important part in the war of h i  
eration tbat China is waging against the Japanese invaders. 4 
The Eighth Army has retained its splendid traditions as 
regards political work among its personnel. Politically its 
men are considerably better developed than the soldiers in 
tbe other Chinese form. The men of the Eighth Army ah 
quite clear as to the aims of the war of liberation against 
Japan, they redize perfectly that only prolonged armed re- 
sistance can bring victory o& the Japanese invaders, Polit- 
ical work in the units of tbe Eighth R a t e  Army is con- 
ducted both on the march and dnring active service. The 
army implicitly obeys the orders of its commanders; it 
i 
b w s  no of desertion. The relatiom between the corn- 
manders and the men axe those of friends and comrades. 
Every regbent or other brge unit of the Eighth Army 
has its politid dqmtmmt; the battalions have poIitid in- 
structors; the mpzmies, politid leaders; and the rqi-  
men& brigadca and dividons, politid cammishlpnr. The p 
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Iitical leaders and military command of the Eighth Route 
Army, beginning with the W i m  wnnmndtrs, d of 
Comrmmists. Communist nuclei exist in all the units of the 
Eighth Army. The Commmists make up abut m p r  eent 
of the army, which consists largely of workers and 
A third of its wmmandm and men consists of workec~, 
artisans and laborers, and the rest of pmr and middle F 
ants and intellechrals. 
The degree of activity and the internal unity of the 
Eighth Army arouse the respect of other army units. A Ku* 
mintang newspaper correspondent who visited the Eighth 
A m y  headquartets to interview Chu Teh wrote in his 
article: .. 
'Wh~hetl I reaehed the gates of the Eighth Army head- 
quarters, I saw an old man dressed in a private's uni- 
form. This spectacled old man was reading a news- 
paper- 
"The Chief of Staff introdud me to Chu Teh, and I 
was surprised at his simple and cordial manners. I had 
dinner with him; the food was the same as that served 
to all the men in the army. I talked to the men and to 
the wok and m e  to the conclusion that in the Eghtb 
Route Army everybody, beginning with the commander- 
h&ef and ending with the rank-andde men, the 
m k s  and the stablemen, is bound by one common cause. 
1 was mnch imp- with the esBrif ds corks of the 
Eigbtb Army and the educational work conducted in it!' 
The Eighth Army devotes. parti& attention to demor- 
alizing the enemy forces. The army's politid dqmment 
publishes large numbers of l&ts and pamphlets in Japa- 
nese, Mongolian, lQ lmse  and Korean. The I o d  ppuMon, 
the partian detachments, and also airplanes distribute thidi 
literature in the districts occupied by tbe Japanese. All the 
m m d m  and mm study Japanese in order to carry on 
agitation answg the e h m y  fwces and to talk to the prison- 
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ers. In its appeals to the Japanese soldiers tbe Eighth Route 
Army poinb out that victory for the Japanese rnilibrists will 
only worsen the condition of the Japanese workers and peas- 
ants, while the defeat of military fascist Japan will set free 
the fortes of revolution and enable the working people of 
Japan to throw off the yoke of feudal -pitorlist exploitation. 
The Eighth Army exhorts the Japanese soldiers to ponder 
over what they are giving their lives for m the fields of 
China and to turn their bayonets against their age-old op- 
pressors, against the militarists. 
"Japanese sotdim,'' one of these leaflets says, ''come 
over to as! We will bat yon well. Do not lay down 
your fives in the interests of the Japanese militarists! 
Let WJ d u d e  an alliance between the Japanese sol- 
diem and the C b m  soldim, let us put an end to the 
war 1" 
These leaflets put out by the Eighth Route Army are often - 
found on Japsnese prisoners4 and w the bodies of those 
killed. Some of the Japamse prisoners of war help to write 
the I d W  and pamphlets in Japanese and even ask to be 
allowed to stay in the Eighth Army and allow their families , , 
to come to China to avoid persecution on the part of the 
Japan= government. 
A Japanese soldier by the name of Nahmura who was 
taken prisoner by the Eighth Army was certain that he 
would be put to deafh. He had been =red by the fabrica- 
tions published in the Japanese,press that the Chinese show 
no qrsarter to prisoners of m. After he had h for some 
time in the district of opedons of the Eighth Atmy, Naka- 
mum wrote an appeal to the Japanese d i e m  in which he 
asserted that the men of the Eighth Route Army 'Ytreated 
him like a brother!' He wrote : 
"The Eighth Army is m army of workers and peas- I 
ants, in whit& dl are weIded by the common aim of 
struggle. I am moved to profwd admiration by this 
% 
army. Japanese brothers! Why do we have to leave our 
wives and children and &&ce ourselm in this war of 
aggression? We are waging this war in the interests of 
the landlords, capitalists and impcdjsh. Let us revolt 
against this blaody slaughter1 k t  us turn our a r m  
@st the militarists and overthrow their domination! 
Brothers! I hope &at in the near future you will all 
shaJse the hands of our brothers, the men of the Eighth 
Army. I am grateful to the Eighth Army for the help it 
has given me." 
The Eighth Route Amy has established very friendly re- 
lations with the l d  population. Before billeting their mea 
in the homes of the Iocal inhabitants, the c o ~ d e r s  ask 
their consent. If any property is damaged in the houses 
w k e  men of t4e Eighth Army are billeted, the m e r s  are 
compensated in money. The pophiion everywheie cordially 
d c o m e  the men of the Eighth Atmy, invite them to their 
bnmes, gke them food and bring them gifts. Of their own 
accord tfrey rep& the roads and assist in transporthg sup- 
plies and ammunition in order to facilitate the movemwfs 
of the Eighth Route Awy. qpgments  the local 
population help to transport the wounded and the trophies 
seized. 
The Eighth Army has acquired considerable experience 
ia re~viting new men As a muIt of the g w d  ieIations it 
tsbblbheg with the 1 4  population, its recmiting c&- 
paigns meet with warm support among the people. It! the 
northwestern part of China one often hears people say: 
*When I join up I'm going to enlist in the Eighth Route 
Army. The Eighth Army has no m r a I  punishment, and 
it knows how to fighLn The temuiting campdgns are usually 
conducted by special groups uuder the charge of politid 
workers who carry on a vast amount of educational and 
mass work among the paplation. 
These methods of replenishing the d s - - b y  means of 
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mass agitatioaal work among the pqhtio- being 
widely practised now dl over .China As a d t  considerable 
reserves have a h d y  been organized. 
Realiziag the advantages of these methods, the Chmese 
go-ent is gradually abandoning the system of pressing 
men into the service. 
These new methods are being most successfully applied 
in the S W  District of the Republic of China. The S@ 
District, organized from what were formerly the Soviet dis- 
tricts, has a fairly large territory. All the peasants have been 
apportioned land and last year, as a result of the efforts of 
the government of the S p e d  District and the peasantry, 
the area sown was increased by aus pw cent. On the initiative 
of the pnpufation a st& of grain for the Eighth Army was 
established in a very short time. 
The workers in the S p e d  District are organized in trade 
uinons with a membership of 3 5 , ~ .  The printing plant, #e 
arsenal, the needIe shops and various other enterprises b+ 
long to the government. The population of the SpeciaI Dis- 
trict indudes also a large number of handicraftsmen. The 
young people here are organized in the Union far the Sdva- 
tion of the Country which has a membership of over 60,ooo. 
The Pioneer organization numhrs over p,m children. 
The Communist Party set itself the aim of making &e 
SpeciaI District a model democratic district. In this it has 
ken successful, and the SpeuaI District is now an impor- 
bnt link in the general system of the u d b t i o n  of all China 
The government bodies of the Special District are elected 
democratically, with the Communist and Kuomintang organ- 
izations prticipating. At the present time, intensive military 
training is going on throughout the District. In case of n* 
cessity the d t s  formed in tfie Special District mn be mdil- 
bed as reinferremeats for the Eighth Route Army. The 
self-defense units of the Special District number over loo,- 
ooo men, and the Young Guard units 50,000. 
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The S p e d  Datrict has a pas of Its owa The uu@m 
Chkhfoprg, pubIisbed & Yenan, the capital of the S&d 
Districtl enjoys great popularity throughout China. At the 
end of last year this magazine was the first tp publish the Ten - 
P h  of t h  Program fat. Resisting lames@ I s n p d d h  
md Sm'w the C-, proposed by the Communist Party 
of China, wbich were later reprinted by many Chinese papers 
and were met with warm response and approval at the front. 
The growing influence and prestige of the Communist 
Party of China, wbich initiated and consistently pdcipfes 
in the anti-Japlrnese national united front, are rdected first 
and foremast in the Communist Party press and the press 
of China's national: united front. 
The Chkwmg, the organ of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, x d e s  a circulation of 30,- and can 
he seen all over China. In January, 1938, the Gmmunin 1 
Party hgan to publish a daily newspapr, the H s i ~  Huu Jik 
Pao, which reached a circulation of 5 0 , m  after one month 
and is now the most widely read paper in China, 
Recently, the political department of the Eighth Route. 
Army began to publish a weekly a l led  Thr Varsglcap.d. With- 
m a v e q  short time the drculation of this w&y mounted 
to 10,- copies. The vast majority of the magazines pub 
lished in Shanghai, before the city was sized by themJapa- 
neae, popularized the policy and the measures advmted by 
the Gmmuaist Party in the war of defense against J a m  
Over tbirty mapzincs of the same trend apmr in R h w .  
Numerous newspapers and magazines pubIished in Cantm, 
Chungking, Chengtu, S n  and other cities readily print 
articles by Communists and popularize the p r t  played by 
the Communist P a q  in the anti-Japanese national united 
front An over the country the people &ow particular inter- 
est towards pamphlets and articles ddiag with the Eigbth 
Army. A vey popttlar pamphlet8 which was pubIished in a 
mass d t b 8  is that by Chu Tch, on the & of and life 
a7 
in the Eighth Army. Quite a n m h r  of publishing h o r n  
themseIves reprint in pamphlet form articles from the Corn- a 
munist newspprs and magazines, since sach pi@dt?ts 
rapidly acquire popularity aft over the mantry and are very 
good sellers. 
On the initiative of the Cmmuaist Party of C h i  a new 
army--the Fourth Army-under the command of Yeh 
Ting, has been Mganized from the partisan units which up 
till recently operated in the various former Soviet districts 
of .Central and Swth China (the provinces of Kim&, 
Fukien, (Chebng, Anhwei, Huttan, Hupeh and Kwangtung). 
These partisan units remained in the districts when the 
main forces of the Chinese R d  Army moved further west 
three or four years ago. They acquired a d t h  of expe- 
rience in &san warfare under the most d i w t  con- 
. ditions. 
At the present time the major part of the Fourth Army 
is concentrated in the vicinity of Nanking, Wuhu, Shanghai 
- and Hangchow. Another section is opemthg to the north 
of the Y-e. A mass partisan movement is developing 
with particular intensitg in the regioa of operations of the 
Fourth Army where recruiting for new unib is ptocteding 
with p t  s u m .  
In July, the Fourth Army, in connection with the Jap- 
anese advance up the Yangtze River, begau operations on 
a pdiMlfarIy wide d e  in a most important sector-the 
triangle Shmghai-Nanking-Hangchow. The purpose of the 
Fwrth Army's maneuver is not only to weatsen the rear of 
the Japanese, which is of rid importance to them since it 
is through Shanghai and Hangchow that the Japanese supply 
the central front with munitions and reinforcements, but 
also to attack them on a wide front from the east in order 
to weaken their offensive on Hadrow. 
Between July ro and July 14, new large units under the 
command of Han Ying broke thmgh the Japmsc line of 
& 
defense in the Sbghai district. Severe %htiog tbok p h  
in the immediate M t y  of Shanghni (Pootmg) and n- 
Chankchow-aa important station on the Manking-Shghi 
railway. As a result of the stubborn fighting in this district 
Fourth Army units crossed the railway and tore up the 
track for several miles. 
TIIE CHINESE PmPLE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
THE JAPAN&SE INVADERS 
T ENS of millions of Chinese people are participating in the war against the Japanese. In spite of the heavy 
toll of the war, the will to resist Japanese aggression 
and the determination to defend the national indepndence 
of China at whatever cost are growing among the Chinese 
people. 
In its war against the Chinese people Japanese imperial- 
ism is resorting to the mast atrocious and barbarous me& 
ods, endeavoring to break the resistme of the population 
by inspiring them with a horror of war, In ucmpied districts 
the Japanese troops set fire to houses, ruthless1y shoot down 
the civil population, sack homes and rape the Chinese women. 
The civil population of defenseless towns and villages is 
being subjected to the most vicious bmbardrnents. 
In retaliation for the activities of the partisans the Japa- 
nese army ruthlessly razes entire towns and villages, shoots 
down the inhabitants who have remained behind, and all 
who live on either side of the railways and highroads. 
In a certain small town of 3,- inhabitants in Shansi 
province, the Japanese slaughtered over 2 ,m,  incIudiig 
even children, two and three years old. In a village with a 
population of over one hundred the Japancse either slew or 
burned ewry person in the town, regaxdless of sex or age. 
w 
After the fall of Nanking the Japanese shot ovm 40,- 
non-ta, The raping of Chinese women b a 4 
m m c e  whenever the Japanese seize a Cbinese town or 
vim. In An& county, Hangchow district, the Japanese 
army of mcupation ran amtlek aad burned down h o s t  dI 
the large villages. Over villages were rstzed by them in 
the vicinity of Paoting, Hopeh Province. Equally common 
is the looting of the Japanese army. For six days the Jap- 
anese looted the a d  trading town of M o ,  Hopeh Prov- 
ince. At1 the shops and stores were robbed and wrecked. The 
Japanese carted away from the t o m  50O,x1o Mexican dol- 
lars' worth of goods, a large part of which they had to a h -  
dm on the mid to saw their skins from the partisans who 
gave pursuit. 
Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai were pithgal, and 
many d m ,  including some in the chmge of foreign 
missionaries, were demolished. Wbole trains and shiploads 
of arc being shipped to Japan from Shanghai, Nan- 
king md Taiyuan. 
The shooting of non-combatants, the air raids, violence 
and looting of the Japanese army arouse the profound in- 
dignation and hatred for the Japanese plunderers among the 
Chinese people. In the &ids near the front and in ' 
those oocupiwf by the enemy, the population is rising against 
Japan, engaging in the most varied forms of struggle a d  
displaying the greatest persistma and heroism. ' 
A mass movement to defend the country is growing 
throughout Cbhm 
The part of vanguard in this movement is played by the 
working cIass, p d c d a r l y  the workers in the war indlls- 
tries and transport. Disregarding thc danger and the sacri- 
fices involvtd, the workers repair the railway lines and 
bridgw w e d  by the hbardmmts, thus ensuring di- 
tary traaspts for the Chinese m y .  
The workers of Shaghi,  Shantung, Peiping arnd of a 
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number of railways in districts uc&d by the -.a 
voluntarily organizing partisan units and are acthe h tbe 
a n t i - J a w  mass o r g a ~ ~ .  During the defense of 
Shanghai the Shanghai workers organized d t s  for &t- 
ing the C b e  army and actively helped them to defend the 
city. Though ladriog in military experience, those units, at 
a critkd moment in the fighting, independently attacked the 
enemy and mptured its machine-gun positions. 
The pawants in the war zone and in the districts behind 
the enemy's fine are also taking an active part in the war of 
defense agdmt the Japanese. In the war zone they perform 
work of the greatest i m m ,  supplying the army with 
horses and arts, ~ & g  ammunition, supplies, and 
the wounded, buifdig fortifications and repairing roads. 
Large n u m b  of m t s  join the partisan units and other 
armed organizations in the enemy's rear. In some prov- 
k e 8  a widapread peasant movement has developed ; the 
peasants undergo military training as is the a, for exam- 
ple, in the proviraces of Kwanghtng and K v i .  But in a 
number of other provinces this is not yet done to a suffi- 
uent extent. 
The Chinese intelligentsia, particularly the students, are 
also playing a sqdicant part in the anti-Japanese move- 
ment. The studcntrs are taking an active part in the organiza- 
tions for m a t i d  &ation, are conducting widespread agi- 
tational and organization1 woxk to mobilize the masses, and 
are joining the Chinese army in groups. At the present time, 
large numbers of students who have enlisted in the national 
sky are being trained as quickly as W b l e ;  some of them 
are also being trained for politid work in the army, others 
have joined the anks and the partisan units. 
A specid organhtiion of c~ltwal workers which includes 
university professors, writers, actors and teachers exists in 
Hankow. Tbis mganktion publishes cheap mam editions 
of litwature, a h  &book. Its agitators and theatrical 
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troupes tour the fronts giving k t u f e s  and presenting plays 
to the men. 
The poor people of the t o m  arc joining the m y ,  par- 
ticularly in the districts threatened by the Japanme invad- 
ers. The wonien, too, and even the children, are taking an 
active part in the anti-Japanese movement; they have or- 
ganized large numbers of Units for Aiding the Front, and 
kave collected gifts for the men; they are organizing medi- 
cal service for the wounded, and traveling dramatic per- 
formmces for aghtional and educational putposes at the 
front. A Pioneers' h t i c  circle was formed in Shanghai 
of the children of workers and poor people, school children 
between the ages of eight and eighteen ; notwithstanding the 
danger involved, this circle visits the front, performing its 
agitationd skits before the troop and the 1-1 population. 
The workers, p s a t s  and the  bourgeois sections 
of the town population are taking an active part in organ- 
izing armed resistan= to the Japancse aggresggrs. 
The raatidnal bourgeoisie of China has, since the kginning 
of the war of defense against Japan, been in favor of fight- 
ing the Japanese invaders. It ddesirts victory over Japan, 
but lacks sufficient confidence in the possibility af a final 
victory. The Chinese bourgeoisie has lost many enterprises 
located in the big cities which were seized by the Japanese 
militarists and has suffered considerably from the pibgkg 
by the Japanese army. 
The Japanese are meting with ever greater difficulties in 
finding the "personnel" for their puppet gwernments in 
the districts they weupy. 
E v a  among the #*mese merchants, manufacturers and 
financiers the Japanese puppet-producers cannot find a 
single prominent personage willing to act as traitor to his 
country, The middle and petty landlords, under the stress of 
the barbarous policy pursued by Japanese imperialism, are 
now expressing their sympathy for the war against Japan, 
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and some of them m even ifcfpplyhg h p r t h ~  
with food. The Japanese imperiatisb, h their W 
solidate their domination ia the regions they have d, 
are W n g  for support among the d o n a r y  h d b d ~ ,  
part of the gentry, some of the old militarists, the rnetcen- 
ary &cials and the d e c b e d  elements, maKing we of their 
T r o e t e  agents for this purpose. b view of this, thc 
Communist Far& of China, which has the interests of the 
whole people at heart, is demanding a most determined 
struggle against d traitors and agents of the Japmae 
invaders. 
The army and the civil population are displaying the 
greatest hemism and selfless devotion in the struggle 
against the Japanese aggressors, The Ehinese army, in spite 
of its technid inferiority as compared with the Japanese, 
offered stubbrn, heroic resistance to the Japanese attack in 
the bitter fighting for Shanghai, Nankow, Sinkou and Su- 
chow. The world knows of the singIe battal iwbont  800 
rnen-left in Shanghai during the evacuation of the Chinese 
forces to cover. their retreat, ready to sawifice itself to the 
last man. After the evacuation of the Chinese forces from 
Shanghai this battalion, surrounded by the enemy, held out 
for over a week of ceaseless fighting. The majority of this 
battalion swceeded in heroically breaking through the enemy 
ring. The splendid feats of Chinese airmen, of rankand- 
file soldiers, of whole divisions and brigades are common 
knowledge. 
The civil population too are fighting like heroes. In 
Tientsin a Chinese chauffeur who was taken prisoner by 
the Japanese and forced to drive a car under their orders, 
ran it into the river at the price of his life. In Shansi and 
Hop& peasants, masquerading as women, Ium Japanese 
soldiers to where the partisans are lying in ambush, or, 
after plying Japanese oRicers and soldiers with drirdr, seize 
and disarm t h .  These are not isolated instances; numerous 
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cases could be dted of the heroic struggle waged by the 
population in thc districts -piad by the enemy. 
The Chinese w o r k  and white collar employees make 
monthly derluetims from their pay for the natimal defense 
fund. h s  are known of Chinese citizens giving all they 
possess for the defense of the country: dme rickshaw puller 
contributed a handful of dollars--all he had mved in three 
pars. Chinese tmipnts in America and other countries 
activeIy and systematidly pllwt funds to help their 
cowltry. 
The Chinese people are realizing more and more pro- 
foundly the p v t  daqpr that threateas their country, they 
ate d n g  to m x h e  that tiae army done is nat enough to 
bring victory over the enemy. Resistance to the Japanese 
invaders is growing and so is the vigilance of the raasses. 
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITE AGENTS 
OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM 
O F ENORMOUS importance for the estabHshntent of na- tional unity is the oonsistent and determined struggle 
which the Cwnmnnist Party of China is waging against the 
Trotskyite agents of J-ese imperialism. The Trotskyite 
bandits in China are directing tbeir infamws activities 
against the unity of the country, against the anti-Japanese 
national united front, against collaboratirln &tween the 
Cornmudst Party and the Kuomintang. The Trotskyite spies 
and diversionists have a number of times a m t t d  to pne- 
trate into the army, into the ranks of the Commmist Party, 
the Kuomintang and other public organhations in order to 
destroy the national united front from within, to help their 
f h s t  masters. 
The Trotskyite bandit Ch;ung Mu-tao, who until his arrest 
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by the Chinese 'autboritite was in the cmpby d the -Jw 
n e s e m t e . U i g m c e s e r v i a e a n d d v d f m m i t o ~ ~ a l -  
1- of fifty to a hundred thowad dobm for the 
Trakyitc m, sent several Trobkyitcs into the Eighth 
Route Army to engage in espionage and diskkqpting d v -  
i t i s  within it. However, the bandits were exposed. The in- 
vdgation mnhcted in this ase showed that the - 
did ewry&hg in their power to instigate desertion, to tm- 
dermine the men's faith in the possibility of victory over 
Japan, to brih the tecbnid personnel of the army in order 
to obtain s t m t  infomation on the disposition of the forces, 
andsoon. 
The Trotskyite spies also attempted to organize terrorist 
groups for tEat p m  of asmsinatiug the leaders of the 
Eighth Route Atmy. The J a p w e  spies m the guise of 
petty tmders often penttrate into the l d i h  where units 
of tbe Eighth Army are stationed and supply the Japanese 
with i n f o d o n  as to the movements of the forces, tbe 
numerical strength of the tmop dispat- to the front, 
the available roiling st&, and m on. 
In Tientsin the Japan* .with the assis- of the Chi- 
- nese Trotskyites, mblbhed an espionage organization a- 
der the name of the '%tern and Western Culture %- 
ciety." In K m g s i  the Trdqite. traitors tried to prevent 
the dispatch of the provincial troop to the Shanghai front. 
In H d o w  they made raids on the editor's oftice and print- 
ing shop of the Cwnmunist paper. Not Ear from Suchow, the 
Japanese set up a sphl  unit of spia and divusionists who 
were to assist tbc Ja-e troops in military ~ t i o n s  
and in und~mmkiq the Cbintse rear. This unit was a h  fed 
hy C&se 'Ikotdqita, who attunpted to esbblish -tact 
with the Trotskyites in H&w and Hongkong to seare 
certain information for espionage purpom. In Homn 
Province tbt Trotete Tshg Lu-ybg o q d d  a bandit 
gang from among the riffraff and the Russian whitqmrda 
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ta fight against the Fourth Psoplels Revolutionary Army, 
In Canton the Japanese agents, in March, 1938, attempted 
to organize an uprising against the national government. The 
uprising was exposed in time and the conspirators arrested. 
The authoritim also exposed several traitors who had sig- 
naled to Japanese planes during the air raids on Canton. 
In Singapore the Trotskyite provwateurs are doing ev- 
erything in their power to prevent the Chinese Defense Loan 
fmm being distributed among the large Chinese workers' 
population living there, because they know that the latter 
wholeheartdy support the struggIe which their people are 
waging against the Japanese aggressors. 
If is i m p i b l e  to enumerate aU h crimes of this con- 
temptible batld of underlings of Japan- imperialism. 
The Communist Party and its press is playing an impor- 
tant part in exposing the Trotskyib as the direct agents 
of the Japanese aggressors, as vile traitors to their cwntry. 
With the help of a mudm of indispuhble facts the Com- 
m\mist Party of China h proved to the masses of the 
people that the Trotskyite bandits are hitors. The fact that 
Chang Mu-tao, the leader of .the Trotskyite gang, was de- 
tained by the population and handed over to the authorities 
is clear proof that the masses of the people have begun a 
struggle against the Trotskyite traitors and fascist agents. 
Individual Trotskyite spies sent to the Eighth Army and to 
the Special District of the Chinese Republic were also ex- 
posed with the help of the men and of the Jd inhabitants. 
The Trotskyite bandits in China ate a h d f u l  of  traitors 
and spies who have no roots among the people. But they 
are filled with hatred for the people and the republic and 
are ready to commit any crime. That is why the struggle 
against the Trotskyite bandib is one of the most decisive 
factors making for victory over the Japanese invaders. 
At the insistence of the, Comtnunist Party and ht accord- 
ance with the wishes of the masses of the people, the go..-- 
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ermatnt has i n b o d d  punitive m r e s  for c m p t  6 
i ciafs, traitors and saboteurs in the gave-t apparatus, 
E wfiich is also a considerable step forward in e o n s o ~ l h g  the unity of the Chinese people. 
1 
T RE longer the war dmgs on, the better will China be able to organize its forces, the greater will ;be its inter- 
nal rmitp, the better will its forms be trained and equipped 
for the decisive c d k t ,  and the greater will be the d i E d -  
tits confronting Japan. Thus a bng-drawn-out war is the 
key to China's victory over be Japanese aggresmrs. 
A Iengthy war will give. China a number of advantages 
over the enemy. China possesses a vast territory, large nat- 
ural resonfoes and inexhaustible reserves of man-power. 
The fact that the J a m  he seized part of its territory 
and wrhh impmiant waters h not dishled Chioa from 
developing further armed resistam. The oomplex topo- 
graphid conditions favor the develapment of a powerftd 
partisan movement in the districg occupied by the Japanese. 
All the factors exist for increasing activity on tbe part of 
the pputatioa in this war of liberation, for ever greater 
i n t u  unity and the creation of new forces and new re 
serves for a pmhged war. 
In spite of its techria1 supriority, the Japanese army a n  
retain in its hards ody a narrow strip along the railways 
and certain large cities, in which the rule of the Japese  
invaders L not stable. This ia due to the fact that the Jap 
anese army is waging a war on foreign and hostile terri- 
tory and that its man-power resemes are limited The 1- 
aad more scattered the Iine of the front, the more acutely is 
Japan bound to feel the lack of its m-power and m a w  
remu- 
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A lengthy war wiil utterty exhaust Japan's finances at a 
tirae whm its dependence on hqmh of stratepklly neces- 
sary raw materials -11s for iarge foreign currency reservcs. 
In addition to the fi& and d c  d m ,  internal 
h a 1  contradictions and anti-war smtiments are growing 
in Japan among the population and in the army. Casts of 
reservists refusing to join up on mobitiorz are becoming 
more and more frequent. The wives and mothers of mow- 
ised soldiers are protesting against the dispatch of their 
sons and husbands to the front. 
These anti-war sentiments are having a profound effect 
on the morale of the Japanese army. Desertion is on the 
in- ; there are frequent ases of large groups of sol- 
diers refusing to leave for the front and of Japanese soldiers 
going over to the side of the Chinese army, sometimes in 
whole groups, taking their arms with them. These are now 
no longer isolated instances. There are scores of cases on 
m r d  of Japanese soldiers who prefer to commit suicide 
rather than shed the blood of the Chinese peuple. A Japa- 
nese soldier by the name of Sikai who waa subsequently 
killed at the front wrote home to his wife : 
"I can't understand why I didn't receive your letters 
for such a long time. Over six months have p-d 
since we were driven here. At first we thought, and that's 
what we were told, that after Shangb& would l~ taken 
we would dl be sent home. But now nobody knows 
when well get back. The supplying of food to us has 
become far more difEcult. We have to requisition it from 
the @ation. Many of my friends have been killed. 
God bows when it wit3 dl end." 
hother Japmetx soldier in a lettet to his father wrote : 
"It's a crud war l How much 1- will it d u e  r'
hcmmts taken from the Japanese soldiers indicate that 
tht Japanax anay ban Pltcady mobikd the sixth m e .  
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The new replenishmetab, from the point of view of military 
and techaid trahkg, are considerably worse than the reg- 
ular army units. 
Very often lea& published by the Communist Party of 
Japan, the Proletarian Party, the Young People's Party and 
other organizations are found on Japanese soldiers who are 
taken prisoner or have been kiiled. One of these leaflets 
states : 
"More than zoo,ooo af our brothers have perished 
in the fields of M h u r i a .  They perished in the inter- 
ests of the miiitarists, capitalists and landowners. We 
must not let ourselves be duped by the a s i l i t a d  and 
financiers. . . . 
"Soldiers! Fricnds I The militarists are sending us to 
a stwe death. We must rehl and in alliance with the 
Chinese soldiers crush our real d e s - t h e  Japanese 
militarists and capitalists, and win eternal peace and 
liberty on the Far-Eastern Asiatic continent !" 
U n d W  to fight, Japanese soldiers are escaping from 
the army to the foreign oonceaions, or, dressed in civilian 
garb, are hiding in the hills and villages, In the French 
Concession in Shanghai there are two hundred Japanese sol- 
diers who deserted from the m y ,  The district of Wusih 
numbers 300 deserters and in the Shanghai district as a 
. whole this number swells to r,Soo. Swne who fail to desert 
commit suicide. When the Chinese troops captured Lyang 
they found in the local school the bodies of thirteen Japa- 
nese soldiers who had m i t t e d  hari-kari. In Siehchiao 
twelve Japanese soldiers banged themselves, in Tsiaochang- 
miao .ten, in Nanyanchiao rhree, and so forth. 
Several -5 arc also m file of anti-mr actions among 
Japanese units. In the middle of July a Japanese unit rc+ 
volted in Amay. Strect fighting book place between the 
molting troops and the Japanese military police. On May 
10, Colon& Yasida, Xssino, O W  and ten soldiers were 
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sentenced to be shot by c o u r t - m d d  for anti-war actions 
and 'Y=omanmiet propaganda ." Since the beginning of the 
war e,ooo Japmese soldiers have been committed for 
trial for refusal to fight. 
The heroic resistance of the Chinese people is having 
direct effect on the movements of other nations subjected 
by Japanese imperialism. The people of Korea and Formosa 
are gradually taking up the struggle for their national 
d p t i o n .  Not so long ago b f u ,  the Ieadw of the 
Formom workers, organized and led an uprising of 7,- 
miners. As am k the Japanese rear is checkered with 
mines which axe gradually begianing to blow up. 
A fact of considerable importanoe, one which serves to 
strengthen the fareign poky position of Chiaa, is that the 
forces of the dm& front, fighting for the muse of 
peace e n s t  fascism md war, are &rowing daily through- 
out the world, that at &e head of this front stands the 
mighty Soviet Unian-that grat friend of the Chinese peo- 
ple, that bulwark of pcace and d-. The working 
masses throughout h e  world are expressing their solidarity 
with China, wbich is fighting for its national independence 
against the Japanese aggressors. They are rendering China 
mnsidemble material assktaace. 
The contradictions within the imprialist camp enable the 
Chinese government to obtain the military supplies it needs 
from G m t  Britain, France, the U.S.A., and wen from 
~ a p ' s  ally--Germany. 
These are a11 very favorable circumstances for China, 
But the most important and decisive condition for victorious 
armed r e s i s m  on the part of the Chinese people is unity 
within the country, the mobilization of dl of China's na- 
t i o d  forces. 
We must not, howeverI close our eyes to the dillimdties 
and dangers that confrant the C h i n e  RepubIic in the war 
of defense that it is waging. 
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These didties are due maialy to tht aconomic back-. 
wardness of Cbiria, which up to the p-t time has had mo 
war industry of its own; to tbe need for rearming and m 
organizing the huge Chinese army k the mi&# of a uw; 
to the inertia af the govemmmt apparatus which has not 
yet been entirely overcome, and to the capitulatorp tenden- 
cies of the pmJapanese elements in certain circles of the 
ruling party--the Kqomintang. 
The maia task which confmnts China today is to create 
and train new armed forces, to effect the unity of all the 
progressive forces of the people, to organize without d&y 
'a war industry and to improve tlie technic81 equipment of 
the nat3onaI army as a whole as well as the partisan units. 
The g u m t e e  of the Chinese people's victory over the 
Japanese invaders lies in a determined shuggIe against aH 
defeatist and capiWon vim and senlimmts, in over- 
coming possible vaulhtions in face of the inevitable difli- 
culties, and in consolidating and extending the anti-fascist 
national united front. Cbina has a long and difficult struggle 
ahead of her but an d y s i s  of b t h  .combatant forces re- 
d s  that there can be no doubt of the ultimate victory of 
the Chinese &E 
THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIOHAL UNnED FRONT 
AND ITS TASKS 
HE anti-Japanese national united fro*, established on 
the initiative of the Communist Party, is the chief con- 
dition for victory over the Japanese aggresors and the 
traasfomtion of Qzina into an independent, free, demo- 
Its backbone is the lasting wbboratim between the two 
most important and influential &es in Chh- th  Kno- 
mintang and the Communist Party. E s t a h M  in 1937 un- 
der the conditirms of the war of national l i b d o n ,  the 
anti-Japanese mticlnal united front is the d t  of the 
unanimous demand of the whole of the people of China 
who are striving for the unity of the country and who have 
reabed that in unity lies China's main strength. And in 
spite of the machinations of the enemies of tbe people of 
Chi-the Trotskyites and other traitors, these agents of 
Japanese i m p e r i a l i s ~ o  undermine the united front, the 
united front is growing in strength and breadth. Many na- 
tional orgadations are now afhliated to the national uaited 
front. The establishment of the united front has put new' 
life into the activities of hundreds of work&, peasants' 
and cultural organizations. The activities of these arganiza- 
tions are now directed towards the defense of the father- 
land, the improvement of the well-king of the masses and 
the democratization of the country. 
The anti-Jqpanese national united front in C h h  is the 
offspring of the people. Xis establishment was enthusias- 
tically acclaimed by the population while its measures are 
being ardently adopted by all organizations throughout the 
country. 
The history of the establishment of the national united 
frmt, tbe history of the relations of the hva main parties 
-the Kuomintang and the Communist Party--is briefly as 
follows : 
In September, 1937, the Communist Party of China pub- 
lished a p l a m a t i o n  announcing the colIaboratiw of the 
Kuornintang and the Communist Party; it reorganized tbe 
Chinese Red Army into the Eighth Revolutionary People's 
Army and fansformed the Soviet district of China into the 
Special Ih'striet. After ten years of bloody war, the Ku* 
Pnintang and the h u m m i s t  Party oace again joined in 
collaboration. But there is a difference between the d a b  
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oration of the Communist Party and the K u c m h m  tu O 
existed 'm the 1-5-27 period of the Chinese Revol~tion 
and as it eKisb now. 
Whereas during 195-27 &is whboration was based on 
a joint struggle (at a certain stage) against the domhtiotl 
of imperialism and against feudalism within the country, 
the main purpose of the present betwem the KW 
mintang and the Communist = 6ght foreign ag- 
gression, the -sion of Japanese imperialism, for the 
national independace and integrity of China. The prpose 
of the present agreement is war against the foreign m a y ,  
the Japanese aggressors. 
The Kuomintang has passed through a number of stages 
in the process of its evolution. At the time when the Com- 
munist Party collaborated with it in 1 g z 5 - ~ ,  the Kuomin- 
tang, as an organidon, represented a M m  K: &the 
national hurgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the glasses 
of workers and pasants. At that time the K d t a n g  
played a revolutionary part; it came close to the petty bour- 
geoisie and the wo-g and v t  masses, which grid- 
a l l y  ousted the influences of the Iaadlord and m i l i d s t  
elements from its ranks. But after it receded from the rev* 
lution in 1927, the Kuomintang adopted the line of struggle 
against the Communist Party, the reactionary line of merg- 
ing with the mititarists and landlords, who began to play 
a dominant part in the Kuornintang, while the workers, 
pasants and considerable d o n s  of the petty bourgeoisie 
left itir mks. 
Later on, under the pressure of the masses of the peopIe 
and the influence of the widespread national liberation move- 
ment which seized all the scchna of the Chinese pap4 
the Kuominmg in 1936 gradually began to resume the psi- 
tiw of a struggic for national liberation. As a result of this 
change m its intermi and foreign poky, and a h  of its m1- 
labmation with the Communist Party, the progressive se+ 
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tion of the Kuominhng came to realiee the need fpr reor- 
ganizing the work of the latter, eliminating a number of 
serious defects in ofgsmization and efiecting greater democ- 
racy within the party. The rank and & of the Kuomintang 
have given active expression to their demand for democra- 
tizing the m, temoving the conservative and wdating 
dements from its leadership and strengthening collabmation 
with the Commtmist Party and all anti-Japanese parties 
and groups. 
The Cammunist Party of China has done its utmost to 
support the progressive elements of the Kuomintang and 
their efforts to purge tba Kuomintang of degenerate feudal 
elements. 
Wben the present war of defense began, the Kuomiatang 
directed the central government of China, had a strong army 
and a large prcss. The W u n i s t  Wrty of China was in 
contra1 of the territory of the Sviet District and guided 
the Cfimese Red h n y .  
The Communist Party has developed both ideologically 
and orgadat id ly  since the rev01utim of 1 9 5 - q .  Its 
political influence and prestige among the ptople of China 
have cansiddly grown and consolidated. 
"During the fifteen years of its existence," wrote 
Comrade DirnitroiT in August, 1936, "the Communist 
Party of China has grown up into a powerful M u -  
tionary paw, steeled h the fire of the Chinese revolution, 
into one of the best Sections of the Comhtem. . . !' 
Its leadership bas become stronger, the Party has k o m e  
Bolshtvized, it has mastered the new strategy and t a c h  
ensuing from the decisions of the Seven& Congress of the 
Comintero and the actual situation in the camtry, and these 
factors have been of decisive i m v  for the developing 
- 
* Geotgi Dimimff, T h e  Fiftcctlth A n n i m  of dw themmunia 
Part, of Chiia;lin' T h  C w  I-, No. 10, 1936. 
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and camtidating of the anti-Japanese mtiomal~Imit& R.glma 
in existerm today. 
It is not only the workers sad pmmds whu are taking 
part in the war against J a m ,  but atso the pcqtJt bou+c 
and the dd big bourgeoisie. In concluding its slgree- f I mcnt with the K d - g ,  the Gmmunist Party was guZded by the faodammtstl slogan: mEvrising must be sorbordb atsd to the kXFk of J W f  Ail d d s  mwt Bs mdi the iGh# of thh p h d p d  a d  bariE task wrd M be srrbo*dagd to it. The K W t a n g  and the Commt~niSt t Party, joined in the d a a l  anti-Japanese united front, are acting on the bssis of a common p g m m ,  providing joint l e a d d p  and IPearing joint responsibility. What they axe striving for is not to undermine each other by mutual 
sttuggle, but, on the contrary, to facilitate eaeh other, to 
1 
k avoid and mitigate any differences that may arise within 
Z . the national united front. Tht Communist Party insists that 
k aU omtbJapws8 parti= and groups be enlisted in active 
w o k  in the national united front. 
The of the Commuaist Party and the Kuo- 
mintaq is t i a d  on pmedng the -d in& 
pendenee of tLtcsc @eg and on freedom of criticism, the 
t, latter to be friendly and not hostile in character. The col- 
k 
- laboration of the parties in the national united front is 
IT dimed, on the m e  band, against m p W o n  and compro- 
mise and, on the other, against sectarianism. It is on the 
basis of t h e  principles that the Communist Party of China 
at tbe very beginning of the war of defense proposed col- 
Mmratiwl to the Kuominm, it is on the basis bf these 
priaepfes that it hains its members, and it is these prin- 
ciples that it disseminates in the press and in its work of 
agitation 
h its appeal of l k c h l x r ,  1937, the Communist Party 
of China ddarcd that the mkboration of the Communist 
Party with the KuaDnintang will be a lasting me, that tbey 
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agree on collaboration not only for the time when t&stanCe 
must be ohred to the Japanese aggressors, but will con- 
tinue to collaborate after victory over the Japanese invaders, 
in order by their joint darts to build up a d a m d i c  China 
The Trotskyite bandits, under cover of -gic p b a  
about unity, supported the proposal that the Cwnrmtaist 
Party be 1iquidated-a proposal whiEh p r m d d  fiom cer- 
tain reactionary and aeemttive elemenh. The Tmtdqik 
traitors, those direct agents of Japanese imperiatism, util- 
ized for this work of pmvmatim both avowed adherents of 
Japan aad people with little LUI- of politics, who 
i n t h i r d v c t C ~ t k i t h e ~ o f ~ p a r t i e 8  
and t r d s  into the Kmmintang m l d  hmmse China's 
Qghting dkiaq in the war against Japan. 
The rCwnmmist Party has exposed the provocation that 
underlies t h e  attmpts. M e  Mao Tse-tung declared 
in one of his speeches that the attempt to abolish the Com- 
munist Party on the paetRxt of establishing unity t the 
country would ~e.tuaUy h w  China back to the prearbus 
s iWm that existed before the war pf defense began, be- 
fore &* the progressive r u t i d  forces of Chi= were 
united, He pointad out that the cobbration whicb exi~ts 
betwtea the Communist Party and the Kuomintang at the 
present timc bas brought about the unity of all the d m ' s  
form, united for armed resistance to Japan; thst the Com- 
munist Party is fighting to realize the Three Peopfe's Prin- 
ciples of Sun Yat-sen (nationalism, dmmcmcy and the 
well-being of the people), which, far from contradicting 
communism, are fully compatible with the convictions of the 
Conmunist Party. 
Mao Tse-tung said : 
'We are skiving far the r&on of commuaism, 
but at the present stage we are mnying out the na- 
twnaldemmmtic revolution. And that is why the Com- 
& 
lllrrrlist Party has advanced the slo@n of &dag tlgr " 
anti-Japanese n a t i d  united front and a t t a i d  h w  
cratic republic, As for rd iz ing the mUae PeqWbi 
Prinaples, the Co- fourteen years ago, at the 
fist Congress of the Ktiomintang, together with the 
Kuomhtmg, adopted a decision that they should be 
realized, and thae principles were being rea1' i  in the 
countq in 195-27 both by tbe Communists and by the 
Kuomintaug. But unfortunatdy the rupture of tbe 
united front in r927 delayed the realization of Sun Yat- 
sen's Thm People's Principles for ten y m .  
"The policy which the Communists have pursued dur- 
ing these ten years corresponds on the wbofe to the 
revolutionary spirit of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's 
Principles. The Communists have never for a mmmt 
abaadoned the struggle a&st @edim+m . . dthrrt 
today is codstent dodim; the Sopi& of feoplt's 
Deputies are models of consistent democraq ; the agra- 
rian revoIutim is undwbtedly o m  of the dtim 
for improving the welfare af the people!' 
Mao Tse-tung went on to explain m behalf of the whole 
Party why the Communists have p m d e d  from the work 
of organizing Soviets b the slogan of a democtatic republic: 
"The Chinese Cammunists, with the principle of 
Marxism as their basis, developed a general program of 
the first united front, a program of struggle for the 
realization of Sun Yak-sen's Three People's RMpIc8, 
and that is why the Communists duly proposed, st tht 
moment when the memy kwdd m territory, when 
the country's psitim bemne most diihlt ,  that a 
national detaocrstic united front be tstabhhui, for that 
was the only means of saving the countzy from doom." 
True to the t-hings of Mam, Engels, Lenin and S&, 
the C o d t  Party of China is resolutely and m i s h t l y  
khting for the mabation of the poky of the anti-Ja-e 
n a t i d  united f m t ,  a policy w W  msuw fmm China's 
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present4ay situation and conform to Sun Yar-sen's Three 
Prindple8. 
As far back as x g r q  Lenin, in an article entided "De- 
mmmy and Narodism in China," exposed the elements of 
N- utopia in Sun Yat-sen's tmddngs and platform, 
but at the same time he pointed oat their vast progressive 
dgdkncc for such a country as China. 
"A militant, sincere spirit of demacracy," wrote Le- 
nin, "pervades every line of Sun Yat-*s platform. It 
reveals a 'thorough appreciation of the inadequacy of a 
'racial' revolution. It does not htray a trace of the 
non-political spirit or of indifference towards politid 
liw, or any admission of the idea that Chinese auk -  
racy is compatible with Chinese ' d a l .  reform,' with 
Chiaese constitutional reforms, etc. It is the expression 
of complete democracy and the demand for a republic. 
It directly presents the qudoa of the conditions of the 
masses, of the mass struggle; it expresses warm sym- 
pathy for the toilers and the exploited, belief in the 
justice of their cause and in their strength. 
"What we have before us is a really great ideology of 
a really great people, which is able not only to bemoan 
its age-long slavery, not only to dream of Iikrty and 
equality, but is able also to fight the age-long oppressors 
of China." * 
Lenin characterized Sun Yat-sen as a revolutionary demo- 
crat full of nobleness and heroism. Sun Yat-sen h i d f  
fought for a united front between the Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party. As far back as the First Congress of the 
Kuomintang in January, ~ g a a  Sun Yat-sen insisted on the 
mity of action of these two political parties. He stressed 
the necessity of this unity in his political testament to the 
+ hnia, UDcmocmq and Namdism i o  China,#* Ssiectd Works, Wol. 
W, p. 306, International, Publiltrs, New York. 
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I - T  r r p  Kuombhg. The China Gommunists, adhering to the best democratic traditions of their people, are striving their utmost . so that the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen be realty and consistently carried out. They remember the mds  of Cotn- 
rade Stah that 
". . . the strength of the national movement is deter- 
mined by the degree- to which the wide strata of the 
nation . . . partkipate in it+'' * 
I The policy of the Communist Party of China in estab- Iishiug a wide anti-Japanese national front met with support among most of the pregressive elements in the country and within the Kuomintang. 
The recent Specid Congress of the Kuomintang, held in 
March, 1938, and the session of tbe National Political Corn- 
cil w h i i  was held some time later, marked a step forward 
in matters of foreign and home policy and in the reorgan- 
ization of the Kuomintang. The Congress proclaimed con- 
tinued determined resistance to Japanese aggression, and 
adopted a decision on anyhg out a number of d-tic 
rnear;ures-freedom of sped,  of the press and of assembly, 
and the right of associatiepmvidad these activities were 
in no way detrimental to the conduct of the war against 
Japan. The Congress a h  outlined measures for reoqpiz-  
ing the Kuotnintmg and a-ted a decision of prime impor-. 
t m c d e  estabfishing of o National Politid Council. The 
decision adopted by the Cmgress on organiring a national 
revolutionary Chinese Youth League was also of great 
importance. 
No doubt exists that the measures outlined by the ma- 
gress of the Kuomintang and the first sessioa of the National 
Politid Council will ensure the f h e r  growth of the forces 
* J m h  Strlin, M#& md tk Nirliond end Codonkt Q t ~ ~ r i m r ,  
p. IS, Intcmaticmal FubZidKrq New York. 
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of the great Chinese people, on condition, of course, that 
. they be resolutely carried out. 
As the war against j a p  p d s ,  the coUabmtion be- 1 tweeD h e  Kuombtang and the Comtnunist Party will grow , 
and develop. The first year of the war has clearly proved 
that only by co1labof;~tion between tbe Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party w i U  China be able to oBer successful re- 
sistance to Japanese aggression. 
In his appeal to the pcopk and in the interview he gave 
to foreign mespondcats on July 7, C h h g  Kai-shek made 
a number of weighty statements with regard to the necessity . 
of a still understanding between the Kuomintang and 
the Communist Party in the interests of uniting and saving 
the country. A split between these two pdes would mean 
inevihbIe defaat for C h k  in the war against Japan. The 
Japanex imperialists, the pro-Japanese ia China, the traitors 
and Trotskyite bandits are doing their atmost to undermine 
the unity and solidarity of China, and, first and foremost, 
to dmlish the collaboration between the Kuomintang and 
the Comrndst Party. Japanese imperiafim is straining 
every ner~e  to undermine this mlhbratim. It is therefore 
the duty of the Chinese p p I e  to strengthen to the utmost 
the solidarity of the national united front and to manifest 
greater vigilance to the wreckhg work of the agents of the 
Japanese imperialists. 
The Communist Party of China is centering its attention 
primarily on organizing the broad rnasseMbat solid found- 
ation of the united front. 
Owing to the establishanent of the anti-Japanese national 
united f rmt, the Communist Party was enabled to revive 
legal activities in a number of provinces and cities of China. 
The Par,ty organizations in the provinces of Shansi, Shensi, 
Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, Kwangtung, Hupeh and Szech- 
wan are very active, and often play the lding pari in the 
partisan movement and the mass organizations. At the pres- 
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ent time the Communist Party is giving special attention to I mnrolidating its mars work among the workers and to ex- 
tending the influence of the national united front to the 
trade union organizations. The Red trade unions are now 
joining the Kuomintang trade unions and the Communists 
are q i n g  on much agitation and- explanatory work to 
d t  new members fox these unified trade unions. 
Communists are working actively in the rear of the Jaw- 
nese-in the districts they have mcupied. In these districts 
tm the ammrmist oqdzat iws  arc following the line of a 
national united front, orpizing student unions, women's 
orgmbtims, ,Weties of Nationat Satvation, various other 
mass organhtiotls and armed defense units. 
The Commm*st Party is continuing its persistent struggle 
for purging the ~~t apparatus of pro-Japanese trai- 
tois, for enlisting the progressive forces of the country in 
active work, These means will serve to improve datims 
between the central government and the lmal authorities and 
to bring tbt gavernrnerrl even closer to the broad masses nf 
f h e p p u h t i ~ ~ ~ .  
S-sfuf cdalmation ktween the Kuomintang and 
the Communist Party makes possible the further democra- 
tization of the camtry and improved f untioning of the gov- 
ernment apparatus. All these activities of the national anti- 
Japanese united front are subordinated to a single goal, a 
single hsk- the defensive effwiency of Qlina, 
welding the a m y  with the people, building up reserves, 
training q&ed and politically reliable cadres for the army. 
The basis of the anti-Japanese national united front in 
China is extending more and more, the anti-Japanese move- 
ment is drawing in ever new masses of the population. 
There a k no doubt that the longer the war of defense 
drags out, the grmter wil l  be the will of tbe Chkme people 
to resist, the greater will be its organized forces. 
Not to retreat &fore difficuIties, but to &ee ever new 
forces of the nation so as to achieve complete victory over 
the Japanese vultures-such is the- main f ogan of the 
Ch lnese ' masses. 
I N THE Far East of Asia, and in the Far West of Europe -in China and in S & A e  flames of war are raging, 
kindled by the fascist pirstes. This is a war of the fascist 
brigands against the libwty and independ- of the peoples, 
against universal peace. 
The Spanish and Chinese p e o p l d e  vanguard in the 
struggle against world xeaction and farrcismre coura- 
geously defending not only their own national independence 
but also the cause of the whole of advanced and progressive 
humanity. On their side is the ardat  sympathy of the 
broad masses of the people, of all honest people thro~~~ho& 
the world. Fascism is plotting ever new villainies against 
the p~opIe. 
"If the Japanese fascist miIitatists succeeded in sub- 
jugating the people of China," states the manifesto of 
the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Com- 
munist International, "it would signify an unparalleled 
intensification and expansion of fascist aggression both 
in Asia and the Pacik Ocean as well as in Europe and 
in other parts of the world. On the other hand the vic- 
tory of China wiU h a strong blow at the predatory 
plans of all fascist aggressors. Thus the war of libera- 
tion of the Chinese people is a vital, integral part of 
the general struggle of the world proletariat and the 
whole of progressive mankind against the tyranny of 
badmian fascism." 
The war of national liberation which the Chinese people 
are waging against the Japanese aggressors is already in its 
second year. Hundreds of thousands of citizens of China 
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have given their lives defending their country from tl~@ 
depredations of these vandals. The fruits of many centuriedF 
of labor have been destroyed by &e Japanese invaders. In 
the occupied districts the Japanex have instituted a reign 
af terror, of bloody mrnage and mass daughter. 
But during this year of war the Chinese people have 
achieved what they Iacked most-unity, athe rallying of their 
forces. The experience of the past year has shown that the 
Japanese invaders will not achieve what they set out to d+ 
to turn China into their colony. 
"The country is now united," declares Mao Tx-tung, 
"and we enjoy the sympathy and support of the dem* 
cratic forces throughout the world. . . . Our forces, our 
might will undoubtedly grow in the process of the 
struggle. . . . China ean never be destroyed no matter 
wbat foxes Japan puts into the field." 
The Chin= p p l e  feel the suppart of the working peo- 
ple and all sineere democrats throughout the world. mima 
--confident in its strength-is fighting for liberty, for the 
liberty of the whole of mmkind. 
The further support of China on the part of the whole 
of advanced and progressive -kind will not only inspire 
the people of China still more and serve as a pIedge of the 
victory of m a ,  but also be a valuable contribution to the 
cause of the struggle for peace throughout the world. 
APPENDIX 
INTERVIEW GIVEN BY MAO-TSE TUNG TO MR. WA#G KUNGTAII, 
CO-PONDEMT OF THE ASSOCIA- PRES 
I w FEBRUARY, 1938, Mr. Wang Kungid, a correspondent of the Arnerimn Assdated Press Agency, arrived in 
Yenan and obtained an interview with Mao Tse-tung, The 
text of the interview, as r e e d e d  by W q  Kung-tab and 
approved by Mao Tse-tung, was published in the C h i g h f w  
(Liberation), the organ of the Commttnist Party of C h i ,  
in its issue of May 5, rg38, No. p. 
QvestiPrr: At the p-t. mommt many people regard the 
prospects of China waging a war of defense with pessimism. 
What is your opinion ?. 
A-: I am inclined to be optidtic. Reverses and suc- 
cesses are bound to alternate in a war of defense : first there 
may be defeats, then victory is won. The side that is w d  
I I .at the outad later proves to be rho-uch is the usual, 
establish& trend of development. 
During the first period of the war between Japan and 
China we cwld  describe the general situation by saying 
that Japan was strong and China was weak. But from now 
on the position will be different: Japan's weak spots will 
gradually be disclosed and will grow, whiIe China's forces 
will gradualIy increase and consolidate. Japan just now is 
agam resorting to floating a loan. In the six months that 
it waged war in 1937 J a p  spent a,sm,oooloao yen; it is A 
said that this year Japan will spend another 4,um,,000,mo 
yen, but actually this S u m  will probably be m r .  This is 
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p t l y  undermining the n a t b d  shxngth of Japan even 
now. Her international credita are falling, her state loans 
arc d-, her plan of swift war and swift victory" 
has met with defeat. 
T k  posifioa ai t i is front. China's front extends from 
' 
Hangchow to Paoteh-+ distance of several thoustnd Ii.* 
The Japanese are short of form to d e f d  the front. Thus 
the further they penmate into China, is., the longer the line 
of the front m a d s ,  the weaker the Ja-e forces become. 
Japan bas seized a numkr of railway lines in Wna, but 
it has to post troops to guard every station. Japan has al- 
ready mobilized a third of its military forces for the war 
of @on in C h k  If it wants to seize Hankow, Canton 
i and othcr cities it wiU ha% to motriliee at least several htm- dred thousand more men, and then its position will be very 
precarious, This i s  the more inevibble sin& Japan is faced 
not only with China. The -tion of Japan$ inter+- 
t i o n a l a n d i n ~ ~ ~ i s a l s o a f a c t o t t h a t w i H  
help to send Japan inevitably to her d m .  
Qtfesrio#: Do you d d e r  that China's forces con- 
stantly -? 
A m :  Judging from the experi- of the last few 
month, we can say tbat if we in correctly coordin- 
atiug three types of war-tmtical, trench and p w h n  war- 
fart+the enemy's fom will inwitably find themselves in 
a very difficult position. In my opinion, what we must do 
now is organize a few more strong route armies numbering 
two to three hunched thou=nd picked men, deliver mushing 
blow8 to the advance guards of the enemy with the aim of 
destroying them by mmemerhg tactics; in addition eighty 
to ninety thousand reffclEar army men should be assigned to 
form twenty or thirty well-trained p a r k  rt?giment~. Each 
of these highly trained regiments could consist of three or 
four thousand men. 
These regiments should be given resolute and self-reliant 
commanders, political work in them should k improved, and 
they should be dispatched to the front between Hangchow . 
and Paoteh. These regiments must use the breaches that 1 
would form in twenty or thirty spots along such an enor- 
mously extended frmt, in order to penetrate into the rear 
of the Japanese army. And if they act correctly, they will 
succeed in uniting with the population and setting up innu- 
merable small partisan units; they will be able to estiblish 
anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, rouse tens of millions 
of people, and provided they correctly cuordinate their ac- 
tions with the flanking operatiis of the regular armies, 
create insuperable obstacles for the enemy. 
I 
As regards k c h  warfare, if cannot Rrve as the main 
form of operations at the present time on account of our 
inadequate equipment, We must b d d  up a defense industry 
of our own, so as to produce heavy armaments and anti- 
aircraft guns ourselves. At the same time we must take 
. 
every step to import armaments from abroad, for they 
are indispensable in trench warfare. And we must wage 
energetic trench warfare, both defensive and offensive in 
nature. 
Some people say that we advocate only partisan warfare. 
That is nonsense. We have always stood for coordinating 
tactical, trench and partisan warfare. At the present time 
tactical warfare is our main form of operations and the 
dher two are auxiliary. In the future we must work hard 
to coordinate tactical with trench warfam. Partisan warfare 
has always been and wiIl be an auxiliaty form. But in a na- 
tional liberation war in a semi-colonial country, particularly 
such a country as China, with its vast territory, partisan 





The coaatry is now united, and we enjoy the:- 
and sup+ of the demmtic  f m  tbughmt the - 
But the unity we have achievd is not get s&chnt; we muSe 
msoridate and extend it. haeasing the country's r d b q  
and politid might is an indiqxmable condition far victory, 
Our forces, our might will undoubtedly grow in the pxocess 
of fore the us. struggle. Such are the bright prospects we aee be- '1 
Questbs: Does the Eighth Route Army stand in danger 
of king entirely summded by the Japanese and wouId not 
the htter in this way be able to rout or even utterly de- 
stroy it? 
A m r :  At tbe present time the Eigbth Route Amy 4s 
waging a widespread pa- struggle in the following four 
large districts: 
The 6m district covers the Iodity traversed by four 
raifways-t.he P e i ~ H h w ,  P+i-Siyuan, Cheng- 
ting-Taiyuan and Tatpg-Mow r a i I w a y ~ n d  the regions 
adjoining it on the north and a t .  This district is inhabited 
by a population of IS,- who are fighting vigorously ' 
against Japanese imprialism. They are all closely connected 
I with the Eighth Army. This &district ie one of the most im- portant centers of resistaaEe to Japan, and rhere the Eighth Army is already M y  established. At present the enemy is 
intensifying o W v e  o p e d m  in this district, but never- 
theless i t d  not be able to dislodge the Eighth Amy, let 
alone destroy it. A nuhber of d t s  of the Eqhtb A m y  act- 
ing Independently are atready approaching the region of 
the Tientsin-Pukow railway. 
The second district covers the northwestern &rt of 
Shansi--the districts to the south of the Peiping-Suiyuan 
railway, to tlq west of the northern sector of the Tatung- 
Puchow dway, and to the east of the Hdg-ho  River. 
The third district cover6 the southeaskern part of Shansi 
and the snuthwestern p r t  of Hopeh Province, that is, the 
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districts lying between the PeipingaHankuw, Chengthg- 
Taiyuan and Tatung-Puchow railways. 
Tb fourth district fia in the southwestern part of S h i  
Province. 
The Eighth Army everywhere acts in close contact with 
the 1-1 popdation and constantly cuts the lines of cammu- 
nication in the rear of the Japanese troops. It has already 
won a large number of major and minor victories and has 
considedly reduced the enemy's offensive force. In these 
districts China has lost only a number of railways and cer- 
tain cities, raining the rest. This example graphidly 
proves that if it adheres to this method of warfare China an 
never be destroyed no matter what forreg Japan puts into 
the field. The districts now occupied by the Eighth Amy 
will continue to serve as a powerful center for launching a 
wunter-uffensive against the Japanese m y  and for a 
stwggIe to M w e  China's lost tenit6ry. 
Qwrsfiotr: Do you think that the =sent collaboration be- 
tween the Kuornintq and the Commdst Party will be 
' h&g? 
A s :  Yes, I do. The split that took place betwe& the 
Kuornintang and the Communist Party in xgsa;r was against 
the Communist Party's will. The Communist Party never 
wanted a split with the Kuomintang. During the last tm 
yean, the Kuomintang, the Communist P&y and tbe entire 
Chinese nation have been taught by bitter exprience where 
division of forces lads.  This exprieaee will undoubtedly 
help us to become still more united. The p q m e  of our 
present and future colhboration is a joint struggle against 
Japan& aggrdon and joint work in developing the coun- 
try. Tf we o b s e ~ e  these conditions, if the parby with which 
we mow have friendly relations is as sin- as oudves ,  
our coIlaborstion, cwtrolled by all the people of China, will 
naturally be of a I d n g  aatare. 
Question: In its declaration on the situation in C h  the 
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Communist Party p m h h e d  that the pwpme of a 
tion between the Kmintang and thc Gumn& Xaartp ia 
b not on~y to wage a joint struggle qpimt ~aprnae ~ g s ~ b  
sion but also jomt work in developing the -by after 
victwy over the aggressors bas been achieved. The question 
arisea, however, how two parties can oollaborate in 
dwelopmg the new state if they represent two different 
classes. 
Anmwr: China is s semi -co ld  country, its exis- as 
a nation is endangered. Nay, more, China is faud with tbe 
danger of being t m e d  into a colony of Japanese imperial- 
ism. And though Merent parties represent different -, 
their situation under the prevailing conditions is alike. As 
a result they can c o b r a t e  not only in the struggle  again^ 
the Japanege aggrrasols, but in developing the c-try as 
well. However, their d l a ~ t i o n  must k based on a defi- 
nite program. It must be based on principle, and productive 
of results, not forced and format, No political party follow- 
ing de6rite principles wouId allow tbat. Glhboration based 
on a definite program and prindples resembles the heart- 
felt friendship of genuine friends. Only such a heartfelt 
friendship can be lasting. 
I Qwsh'on: How do you picture the democratic republic advated by the Communist Party 7 A w :  In the. democratic republic which the Communist 
Party adv-s, ~~ will be elected by our people, 
who refuse to be coloaiaI slaves. Elections will be basd on 
universal sufIrage without any restrictions. Ours will be a 
demoeratic s y e .  In bmad outline it will be that state on 
whose establishment Stm Yat4en insisted long ago, It is 
along these lines that the Chinese state must develop. 
Quustion: Is the Communist Party partytided with the pres- 
ent central government ? Does it consider a provisianal Na- 
tional Assembly necessary? 
Anmwr: We support the present central government since 
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it is pursuing a determined plicy of struggle against Japa- 
nese aggression and is heading armed resistance to Japan. 
But we hope that this governmeat will be atended and en- 
larged, ahd that certain necessary reforms will be carried 
out in its borne poIicy so that this policy may even more 
effectively further the interests of the war of defense. We 
have proposed the convocation of a provisio~al National 
Assembly, advocated im his t h e  by Sun Yat-sen, since we 
think that it would further national unity and would increase 
our forces in the war of national defense. We are ready to 
do everything that really answers the interests of the war 
of defense. 
Qweshn: Is the Communist Party of China directing the 
struggle against Japan waged by the volunteer army of the 
three northeastern provinces (Manchuria) ? 
A m v r :  It is true that the Communist Party of China 
has established close contact with the volunteer army oper- 
ating in the northeastern provinces of China. Thus, for in- 
stance, Ymg Tsin-yiu, Chao, Shan Chi, Li Kun-hen and 
other prominent leaders of the volunteer army are Com- 
munists. The successes they have achieved in organizing 
determined resistance to Japan are generally known. In 
these provinces too a national united front is now being 
realized. Besides the Communists there are also other group- 
ings-various military unia and mass organizations. They 
have already united on the basis of a common program of 
action. 
Qwsbion: What is your general opinion of the position 
adopted by the U.S.A. with regard to the Bpano-Chinese 
war? 
A m :  The support that democracy in the U.S.A. is giv- 
ing the muse of internatid peace, the condemnation of 
fascism by President Rmsewlt; the sympathetic attitude of 
the American papers towards the resistance that China is 
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a&rbg to Japan aad, in particular, the support the masses 
of the h e t i c a n  *pie are giving the Cbinese people in 
their struggle &st J a w  this we w b m e  and are 
grateful for to the American m e .  But we hope that the 
U.S,A, will go further, tbat it will mite with 0th- states 
to wage. a p r a U  struggle against aggrewom. It is time 
for China, the U.S.A. and all other states fi* against 
aggressors to units for the pur- of &sting the enemies 
ef universal peace. 
DECURATIQN BY COMMUNISTS, MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL 
MLITZCAL CQIINCIL OF CWHA 
HE Hsiu Huu JJk Pap has published a letter by Mao TIT se-tung, Wang Ming, Tsing Pan-sing, Lin Chu-han, 
Wu Y u i k ,  Tung Pi-wu and Teng Yin-chao, the Cammu- 
nist P t y  of C b d s  represenwives on the National Po- 
litical Gd. 
The letter states : 
"We, seven members of the Communist Party, b v e  hen 
approd as m e m h  of the National Political Couad Tk 
Central Committce of the Communist Patty of China bas 
d o n e d  our acceptance a£ the gowmnent appointmat. 
The establishment of the Nationd Political Council daring 
the war of liberation evinces tfrat the paLiti-l life of China 
is pmgmsiogtowards demmaq and that the united front 
of the parties and the people is dwIophg still further. 
Mthwgb the Cmcil, both in the m e h d  whereby it was 
established and in its amposition, is not yet an aWuteIy 
representathe body of the people, nevertheless, its authority 
and functions in uniting a11 the forces for armed rdstmm 
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to the enemy show that in its political life China is more 
and more effeaively Moping as a demaracy. 
'We Communists, having in mind the posdbiity of de- 1 
yeloping thc Council: into a genuine h d y  of people's repre- I 
sentativts, will enthmhtically aad sincery partidpatt in 
its work. We p u m e  that our active partiaption in the I 
Council will facilitate strengthening the forces of defense 
of the Wuchang aties (Hankow, Hanyang and Wucba~&. 
"The purpose of the Communist Party of China in pax- 
ticipating in the Council is to colkhrate with the Kuomin- 
tang and other parties and groups in wder to carry out the 
concrete proposals and measures which aim at achieving conl- 
pIete victory in the war of national likation. The repre- 
sentatives of the C d s t  Party will cooperate with other - 
parties and groups so as to defeat the Japanese invaders and 
mate the foundation of an independent, free and happy 
new chin@". 
"In order to acbieve this aim tbe fighting cap& of the 
army at the front must be strengthened and guerilla war- 
fare conducted on a still larger d e .  The. pof ih l  apparatus 
must be reorganized, the formation of popular organiza- 
tions in the various provinces must be encouraged, the 
masses must be orgaanized and mobilized in order to take an 
active part in the armed resistance. In the sphere of the 
national economy: national defense industries must k es- 
tablished rapidly, finances mast be improved, industrial oat- 
put increased and effective measures must be adopted tcl 
improve the conditions of life of the people. The growth 
and consolidation of the anti- Japanese united front will de- 
pend on the application of all these measttres." 
In conclusion the letter states : 
"The Communist members of the Council do not repu- 
diate responsibility on the pretext that the members of the 
Council are not elected by the people. We d t  deeply 
62 
that the mePabers of the M are the emants of the 
-14 consequently m will reaaldy strive tu r u e  the 
d&,hqmanddemmds of the peopleof China. Tim 
r i' unanimous demand of the peopfe is that national d t y  be bimngkned and the Japanese inmima drmcn out of 
China. We hope that our fellow will as& us 
and criticize 'us if we commit any mi-. We bope tbat all 
the m e m h  of the Council will fa11 tke d&m of 9ur 
READ 
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